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Abstract: the election of Barack obama aroused grand expectations in latin america. obama 
was expected to rejuvenate inter-american relations neglected by george W. Bush’s administra-
tion. however, the united states no longer sees latin america as “the most dangerous area in 
the world.” economic crises and international problems that obama’s administration had to face 
contributed to Latin America not being a top priority for Washington. One of the first challenges 
for the new administrations was removal of the honduran president by the military. the united 
States adopted pragmatic standpoint and kept the Honduran conflict at a distance – there was no 
hope of the constitutional president regaining his position, regardless of sanctions or political pres-
sure from Washington. obama’s administration contributed considerably to success of the peace 
process in Colombia. stabilizing the situation in Colombia remained one of the security priorities 
of the obama administration. it did not limit its activity to Plan Colombia, but took an active part in 
the peace talks and supported the agreement. obama administration also expanded the goals of the 
Mérida Initiative to go beyond traditional, military methods of fighting criminal organizations. US 
intended to strengthen the rule of law in mexico. the greatest achievement of this administration 
was normalization of the relations with Cuba, a truly revolutionary step. it was possible because of 
the change in the outlook of us public opinion on the matter of normalization, pressure from latin 
american countries, and the change in the Cuban regime’s approach to the us. 
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introduCtion
When Barack obama was inaugurated as President of the united states in 
2009, latin america celebrated. there was a general anticipation that obama’s 
election would work towards improving latin america’s relations with the us 
following their decline during the eight years of the george W. Bush presidency. 
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Obama, the first African American to serve as president, quite naturally garnered 
affection in latin america where previous decades had given rise to the emanci-
pation of indigenous and colored peoples.1 Public opinion polls clearly indicated 
greater approval for the democratic candidate than for John mcCain. While ex-
pectations for obama’s administration varied from country to country, they were 
nonetheless, generally undoubtedly high.2 
latin american political elites shared the optimism of the citizens and cen-
trist political leaders were naturally pleased with obama’s election. however, it 
is also noteworthy that even those political leaders who had opposed the us and 
criticized the american development models also had high hopes for the obama 
administration. hugo Chávez, president of Venezuela, announced that he hoped 
for the lifting of us sanctions on Cuba. Fidel Castro complimented obama’s 
intellectual capacity, however he expressed his doubts whether obama was truly 
aware of the international problems he faced.3
latin american public opinion has always favored us presidents who in-
spired hope and affection. John F. kennedy remains a compelling example of 
this. the us ambassador in argentina in the 1960s recalled, “in my four years 
in argentina, i was asked at least once a month to participate in a dedication of 
a kennedy school, road or bridge.”4 similarly, the fascination with obama and 
the hopes that people had for his presidency led to imaginative, sometimes even 
eccentric, consequences. For instance, some candidates in local elections in Brazil 
changed their names to ‘Barack’ or ‘obama’ and Boggy Peak, the highest moun-
tain in antigua and Barbuda, was renamed mount obama.5
Obama’s political affiliation was likely one of the factors behind his appeal. 
the democratic Party is perceived as liberal, which in turn implies empathy to-
wards american partners and a more conciliatory attitude towards international 
politics than would be expected of the republicans. the democrats are asso-
ciated with encouraging democracy and economic aid in latin america. the 
republicans are rather associated with a more pro-business attitude (“depend on 
trade not aid”) and unilateral politics based on power-plays. this view has been 
1  lula da silva, the president of Brazil, expressed the conviction that obama’s election would 
play a part in the political and social changes taking place in the americas: “Just as Brazil elected 
a metal worker, Bolivia elected an indian, Venezuela elected Chavez and Paraguay a bishop, i think 
that it would be an extraordinary thing if, in the largest economy in the world, a black man were 
elected president of the united states.” Quoted in: m. Weisbrot, Obama’s Latin American Policy: 
Continuity Without Change, “latin american Perspectives” 2011, vol. 38, no 4, p. 63. 
2  d. P. erikson, Obama & Latin America: Magic or Realism, “World Policy Journal” 2008, 
vol. 25, no. 4, p. 101. 
3  Castro’s comments on the presidency were made more poignant when the then 82-year-old 
called mcCain “old, bellicose, uncultured, not very intelligent and not in good health.” d. P. erik-
son, op. cit., p. 102. 
4  Quoted in: s. g. rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts 
Communist Revolution in Latin America, Chapel hill, university of north Carolina Press, 1999, p. 1. 
5  d. P. erikson, op. cit., p. 102. 
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criticized by scholars who point out that, besides rhetoric, there is not much of 
a difference in the foreign policy of the two american parties. they also notice 
that the effects of the foreign policies of both parties are the same, despite a dif-
ference in the methods and aims of different presidents. those who propagate 
the view that there has not been much change in us foreign policy towards latin 
america point to certain factors fostering continuity, such as the position of the 
politicians responsible for the policies, the stance of the Congress, and the influ-
ence of public opinion and lobbies, including the large latin american (especially 
Cuban) diaspora in the us.6 
not to go into the details of how the differences in public opinion really 
express the differences in the policies of the two parties, the hopes that obama’s 
presidency would deeply rejuvenate inter-american relations seemed exagger-
ated. Washington no longer sees latin america as “the most dangerous area in 
the World,” (to use kennedy’s words) as it did during the Cold War, especially 
during times of crisis. additionally, long-term political trends and the context in 
which the new president took office also contributed to Latin America not being 
a top priority in the 2008 presidential campaign and during Obama’s time in office.
the continuous democratization of latin american countries after the Cold 
War and their growing economic independence led to a significant decline of 
American influence in these countries. The reformist left grew in power which 
led to the election of inácio lula da silva in Brazil, for instance; however, his 
presidency turned out to be quite moderate. Parties which could be called populist 
came into power in some countries. the term ‘populist’ is subject to contention but 
for the purposes of this paper i will note some characteristics of the governments 
given this appellation in latin america. these are leftist governments which 
endorse the redistribution of gross national income; these governments support 
marginalized social groups and refer to and play on the hostility between economic 
and intellectual elites and people lower in the social hierarchy; they refuse to ac-
cept the (neo)liberal economic development model. a common denominator of 
these movements in different countries is their resentment towards the us and 
the attempt to undermine the dominant position of america.7 these factors have 
limited the US sphere of influence in Latin America. 
While Barack obama criticized the Bush administration’s stance on latin 
america, mentioning “eight years of the failed policies of the past,” and called for 
the us to gain a position of leadership in the area, he did not actually pay much at-
tention to the region. the only speech he gave addressing the matter was in miami 
during a meeting with Cuban-americans. the then senator obama criticized the 
forced ‘top-down reform’. he said: “We need an agenda that advances democ-
6  J. Buxton, Forward into History: Understanding Obama’s Latin American Policy, “latin 
American Perspectives” 2011, vol. 38, no. 4, p. 29–30. 
7  see: Ch. deiwiks, Populism, “living reviews in democracy” 2009, vol. 1, available online: 
https://www.lrd.ethz.ch/index.php/lrd/article/viewArticle/lrd–2009–3 (accessed on: 30.03.2017).
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racy, security, and opportunity from the bottom up.”8 as he was campaigning in 
the rust Belt, obama mentioned that it was necessary to renegotiate the naFta 
agreement; however this declaration was for the benefit of the working-class vot-
ers and did not result in real effects.9
“a new Partnership for the americas” which was published at that time, gives 
a deeper look into the position of the then presidential candidate. among the key 
challenges for his future policies, the document lists economic growth, global 
warming, energy security, and the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism. 
the document promises the reinstatement of the special envoy for the americas, 
strengthening the State Department on a staff level and widening its influence in 
the shaping of us policies on latin america. as a presidential candidate, Barack 
obama was in favor of opening a new chapter in relations with Cuba, underlining 
that this would need to be preceded by a change in the Castro regime. us policy 
regarding Cuba was to be based on building relationships between the us and the 
Cuban people, and one of the proposed methods for this was to lift restrictions 
obstructing Cuban americans keeping in touch with their families on the island 
and sending remittances. obama’s postulations were, in effect, a reversal of the 
five-decade-long US isolation of Cuba.
at the same time, the document states that the embargoes would continue 
and lists various ways the post-Fidel government, led by his brother raul, could 
be assisted in democratizing the state.10 thus obama formulated a policy on Cuba 
which had a goal similar to that of his predecessors – to bring democracy to the 
island. the leading role of the us in this process would serve as a response to 
the anti-american politics of hugo Chávez which arose, according to obama’s 
document, as a reaction to the Bush administration’s policies in the area.11 
obama also underlined the necessity of combatting the increasing crime rates 
in Central america and mexico. this topic appeared during obama’s meetings 
with mexican and Columbian leaders, too.12 the crime issue is not only related 
to the trafficking of drugs into the US – the expansion of criminal organizations 
and the increasing violence had a tangible effect on us security--and obama saw 
the fight against crime as one of his top priorities in the region. However, he did 
not provide any solutions to the problem and only mentioned a “new security 
initiative with our Latin American neighbors – an initiative that extends beyond 
Central america.” the proposals of the obama program were merely an elabora-
8  the White house, Obama’s Speech on Leadership in the Americas, Speech in Miami, 
Florida, 23 may 2008, available online: http://www.cfr.org/elections/obamas-speech-leadership- 
americas/p16341 (accessed on: 30.03.2017). 
9  a. lowenthal, Fresh Start or False Start? Obama’s Partnership Initiative in Latin Ameri-
ca, “the american interest” 2010, p. 109. 
10  obama’08,  A New partnership for the Americas, 2008, available online: http://obama.3cdn.
net/f579b3802a3d35c8d5_9aymvyqpo.pdf (accessed on 30.03.2017).
11  Ibidem.
12  d. P. erikson, op. cit., p. 102. 
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tion of already existing mechanisms of inter-American cooperation in the field of 
fighting crime. Obama also supported the Colombian government’s right to act 
outside its borders in its struggle against terrorism and to employ its military in 
combating the drug trade.13
all of these statements seem conservative. obama criticized the Bush admin-
istration for the deterioration of us relations with latin america, but it seemed 
that the main difference was in the importance obama gave to the issues of latin 
america which had been generally disregarded under Bush.
oBama administration PoliCies
although latin america remained in the shadow of other matters during 
the campaign, obama had to pay greater attention to the region once he took 
up office. This was a result of current events as well as the necessity to address 
systemic issues. obama’s only foreign interlocutor when he was president-elect 
was Felipe Calderón, the president of Mexico; the first guest at Camp David was 
luiz inácio lula da silva. secretary of state hillary Clinton and Vice President 
Joe Biden also met with several latin american leaders.
obama proved his interest in latin america by taking up an active role in the 
5th summit of the americas in trinidad and tobago in april 2009.14 obama made 
a good impression on Latin American leaders during the summit – his actions, 
such as shaking Chávez’s hand--strengthened the hopes of a more temperate us 
policy towards the region and irritated the right wing in the us.15 obama’s speech, 
which seemed to confirm the reorientation of US policy, had a great impact. The 
President admitted that, “the promises of partnership have gone unfulfilled in 
the past,” and, “at times we sought to dictate our terms.” he noticed that the us 
and latin america had found themselves in a situation which was historically 
challenging, especially with the specter of the economic crisis looming. obama 
demonstrated that he represented a new generation of politicians and declared the 
will to open a new chapter in inter-american relations.16 he listed matters such as 
battling the economic crisis and building prosperity “from the bottom up” as his 
top priorities. These entailed directing financial aid towards those most stricken 
by the crisis in latin america.
13  obama’08, A New partnership…
14  a. F. lowenthal, op. cit., p. 109. 
15  a. Barrionuevo and s. g. stolberg, Hemisphere’s Leaders Signal Fresh Start With U.S., 
“new york times” (19 april 2009), p. a6.
16  “i am grateful that President ortega did not blame me for things that happened when i was 3 
months old” in: the White house, Remarks to the Summit of the Americas in Port of Spain, trinidad 
and tobago (17 april 2009), the White house, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 
Barack Obama, 2009, vol. I, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 2010, p. 511. 
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Obama announced the foundation of the USA Microfinance Growth Fund, 
which was aimed at providing loans to small and middling entrepreneurs in the 
countries of the region. he was applauded for saying that, “the united states 
seeks a new beginning with Cuba.” he mentioned the ways collaboration with 
Cuba had already been facilitated and declared his readiness to cooperate with 
the Cuban government.17 many people were optimistic upon hearing these dec-
larations, however Obama’s first term had eventually disappointing results in the 
area of us-Cuban relations.
One of the first crises the Obama administration faced was the coup d’état 
in honduras. a specialist in latin american issues, michael shifter, wrote: “no 
one could have predicted that honduras, the third-poorest country in the Western 
hemisphere, would test the obama administration’s posture toward latin ameri-
ca, its commitment to multilateralism, and its overarching policy on democracy.”18 
This statement is true but with one reservation – the crisis in Honduras had been 
developing for some time and the situation in which a us intervention would be 
necessary was to be predicted. on June 28, 2009, the president of the country, 
Manuel Zelaya, was removed from office by the military and forced to leave 
honduras. roberto micheletti, the leader of the national Congress, became the 
interim de facto president according to the constitution of the country, although 
the deposition of manuel Zelaya was, of course, illegal. 
The coup d’état was the result of a mounting internal conflict in Honduras. 
Zelaya, who came into power in 2005 as a candidate of the center-right liberal 
Party, was seen as a representative of the honduran establishment. yet he went 
through a surprising political metamorphosis during his presidency (it is worth 
noting that such unanticipated events are quite common in Latin American poli-
tics). he became an ally of leftist latin american countries which had a negative 
assessment of the us.19 there is no clear-cut answer as to what caused the shift in 
Zelaya’s policies but what should remain of greatest interest are the consequences 
of this shift, i.e. the ultimate rejection of the president by the establishment and 
the army. Zelaya was accused of violating the constitution of honduras, probably 
rightfully so. 
Zelaya’s deposition led to a situation in which other american countries and 
international organizations (especially the organization of american states) were 
forced to adopt a stance on the unconstitutional appropriation of power by the 
17  Ibidem, p. 511–514. 
18  m. shifter, Obama’s Honduras Problem – The United States and Latin America After the 
Coup, “Foreign affairs” 24 august 2009, available online: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ameri-
cas/2009-08-24/obamas-honduras-problem (accessed on 06.05.2017). 
19  This is a unique example of a right-wing politician changing his views to become a radical 
leftist. in the democratizing nations of latin america, leftist politicians who win elections usually 
change their views to a more central and moderate outlook. see: C. m. Cunha Filho, a. l. Coelho, 
F. i. Pérez Flores, A Right-to-Left Policy Switch? An Analysis of the Honduran Case under Manuel 
Zelaya, “international Political science review” 2013, vol. 34, no. 5, p. 520.
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interim government. the reaction of international society was resolute and widely 
shared. the un, the organization of american states, the european union, and 
alBa (Bolivarian alliance for the Peoples of our america) condemned the coup 
and called for the reinstatement of the constitutional president.20 
The situation in Honduras was difficult and important for the US for many 
reasons. as was mentioned above, after the Cold War latin american nations were 
set on a path of continued democratization. this tendency was constant despite 
a few attempts at overthrowing constitutional governments. although the us had 
supported various coups and authoritarian governments in the past, us adminis-
trations ultimately always aimed at strengthening the democratic process in latin 
america. support for dictatorships, authoritarian governments or, conversely, 
for democratic processes, was dependent on how the US defined its interests at 
any given time. reinforcing the processes of democratization in latin american 
countries became especially important after the end of the Cold War. 
The United States’ reputation for frequently involving itself in Latin Ameri-
can coups led many political critics in the country to raise the concern that the 
us was also partly responsible for the 2009 putsch that had ended in the over-
throwing of Zelaya. Chávez, one of Zelaya’s political allies, was the one who 
put forward the accusation of us interference in the honduran crisis.21 indeed, 
Zelaya’s predilection for the rising wave of latin american populism made him 
a problem for Washington.22 yet, while Chávez may have believed in us interfer-
ence in honduras, there is no evidence that Washington did, in fact, intervene in 
the honduran coup. 
the obama administration was faced with an exceptionally complicated 
issue. From a formal and legal standpoint, the crisis in honduras was a coup 
d’état because a legally elected president had been forcibly removed from power. 
However, as the coup took place with the support of a significant percentage of 
hondurans, it revealed profound political polarization in the country. the actions 
of the military were backed by the majority of the political powers represented in 
parliament (including Zelaya’s own liberal Party), the high Court, the attorney 
general and even the ombudsman.23 this was driven by the general opinion 
that Zelaya was on his way to taking autocratic control over the country. Fear 
of the president’s populism and of repeating the Venezuelan scenario led many 
public institutions and organizations to support the military coup.24 From the 
20  V. saranti, A System of Collective Defense of Democracy: The Case of Inter-American 
Democratic Charter, “goettingen Journal of international law” 2011, vol. 3, issue 1, p. 705–707; 
ALBA Declaration on Honduras Coup d’Etat, 29June 2009, available online: https://venezuela-
nalysis.com/analysis/4564 (accessed on: 30.03.2017). 
21  t. Padgett, The Honduran Coup. How Should the US Respond? “time”, 29 June 2009. 
22  t. legler, Learning the Hard Way. Defending Democracy in Honduras, “international 
Journal” 2010, vol. 65, issue 3, p. 608–610.
23  Ibidem, p. 606. 
24  Ibidem. 
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very beginning, deep social divides hindered outside players (other nations and 
international organizations) from effectively reaching a compromise on the situ-
ation in honduras. Paradoxically, international advocacy for the reinstatement of 
Zelaya could have served to radicalize the position of those who supported the 
coup. especially if diplomatic pressures by means of sanctions and embargoes 
would have been applied – this may have led the illegitimate government of the 
country under embargo to gain legitimization by securing national support in the 
face of outside coercion. these types of actions tend to result in an atmosphere 
of a besieged fortress and the use of emotional political rhetoric.25
the world expected the us to return to a strategy of multilateralism and to 
the promotion of democratic values in its international policy. With this in mind, 
it was difficult to imagine that the first crisis the new administration had to face in 
latin america would compel the President to reply with realpolitik. in reaction 
to the crisis in honduras, obama said: “i call on all political and social actors 
in honduras to respect democratic norms, the rule of law and the tenets of the 
inter-american democratic Charter. any existing tensions and disputes must be 
resolved peacefully through dialogue free from any outside interference.”26 one 
could say that this was a stance typical for Obama – firm in terms of adhering to 
laws and regulations but leaving room for compromise.27 this opinion could also 
be interpreted as one imparting a certain relativity to the dispute. 
the us was especially criticized for apparently failing to recognize the events 
in honduras as a coup which, in light of american law, has real effects in the 
way the US is to aid the nation in question. Obama’s opponents also disapproved 
of the fact that the us did not recall its ambassador, that it did not freeze assets 
belonging to the coup leaders and refrained from instating trade embargoes.28 it 
is worth noting that the administration’s actions were also criticized by those who 
interpreted the events in honduras and the us reaction through a different lens. us 
proponents of a firm policy towards leftist Latin American governments refused 
to view the honduran events as a putsch and criticized the obama administra-
tion for treating it as such.29 the new honduran government made use of the us 
republican support. 
25  s. h. allen, The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure, “international 
Interaction” 2005, vol. 31, issue 2, p. 123–126. J. Grauvogel and C. von Soest, Claims to Legitima-
cy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes, “european 
Journal of Political research” 2014, vol. 53, issue 4, p. 637. 
26  the White house, Statement from the President on the Situation in Honduras, 28 June 
2009, in: the White house, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack Obama, 
2009, op. cit., p. 921 
27  m. shifter, op. cit. 
28  latin american Perspectives, Introduction: The Obama Initiative, “latin american Per-
spectives” 2011, vol. 38, no. 4, p. 10–11. 
29  this was the position of senator Jim demint (r.-s.C.) who, together with some high-
profile Cuban Americans, visited Honduras in order to demonstrate his support for the new presi-
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the view that the us refrained from establishing embargoes because it did 
not acknowledge the honduran crises as a coup does not fully express the obama 
administration’s stance on the matter. in light of so-called ‘coup provision,’ which 
was reinstated in subsequent acts on US foreign assistance operations, the Ameri-
can government should withdraw aid from a country whose legal government had 
been overthrown in a military coup d’état.30 Contrary to many other regulations 
on foreign aid, this law does not allow abstaining from embargoes – recogniz-
ing the events in honduras as a coup would have automatically forced the us to 
withdraw its aid for the country.31 
the obama administration could make use of the doubts which arose as to 
whether the Honduran events were really a military putsch (the situation specified 
in the act mentioned above) since Zelaya was planning on violating the constitu-
tion and was himself deposed by a ruling of the high Court. Following the events, 
secretary of state hillary Clinton desisted from saying whether coup provision 
would be enacted and the us did not withdraw its aid from the country. however, 
the us did revoke $20 million in aid shortly after; although the state department 
stressed that this was not a result of statutory obligations. even when, in 2009, 
the us withdrew all non-humanitarian aid from honduras, the department of 
state was adamant that this did not imply that a military coup had taken place in 
the country.32
it seems that the policy of obama’s administration should be viewed as an 
attempt to keep the Honduran conflict at a distance. US policy was pragmatic in 
this matter – the American policymakers may have viewed the situation as one 
in which there was no hope of the constitutional president regaining his position, 
regardless of the application of sanctions or political pressure from Washington. 
The US attempted to not exacerbate the conflict and tried not to close the way for 
further negotiation.33 therefore the introduction of sanctions only was meant to 
force the heads of the new honduran government to take part in negotiations. at 
the same time, the us avoided enacting coup provision so that american diplo-
mats had a full range of possible actions. 
the us became engaged in hashing out a compromise which would end the 
crisis in honduras and a key role was given to the president of Costa rica. the 
san Jose accord entailed the reinstatement of the constitutional president with 
diminished powers and guaranteed a presidential election in 2009. this accord 
dent. C. sabatini, Rethinking Latin America: Foreign Policy is More Than Development, “Foreign 
affairs” 2012, vol. 91, no. 2, p. 9. 
30  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–161, Sec. 608 available on-
line: www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PlaW-110publ161/pdf/PlaW-110publ161.pdf (accessed on 
30.03.2017). 
31  Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance to Post-Coup States, “harvard law review” 
2014, vol. 127, no. 8, p. 2500. 
32  Ibidem, pp. 2505–2507. 
33  Ibidem, p. 2506. 
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was signed by both Zelaya and the interim president, however it was only partly 
enacted. While the election did take place as planned, Zelaya was not allowed to 
return to office. 
US policy in Latin America has been continuously influenced by both eco-
nomic and political issues. american businesses have a wide range of ventures in 
many latin american countries and these are safeguarded by Washington with the 
help of various foreign policy strategies. another important factor of us foreign 
policy in the area is foreign aid--seen as an investment in improving security and 
development – over the past decades, foreign aid has remained an important tool 
in us foreign policy kit. the us has also become engaged in new activities in 
the region. While it was noticed that, for the first time in history, the number of 
middle-class citizens in latin american society had surpassed that of citizens 
living in poverty, it was also clear that these economic and social conditions were 
unstable and could quickly deteriorate owing to the institutional weakness of 
Latin American governments, the inefficiency of social systems in these countries 
(health and education services), and high crime rates (including the drug trade).34
obama’s administration wanted to see latin america as a place of coopera-
tion of American republics in the fields of modernization and democratization. 
this cooperation was meant to engage, above all, the more ‘sensitive’ nations, i.e. 
guatemala, el salvador and honduras, where national systems were endangered 
by organized crime. the weakness of latin american states was a problem for the 
us and the effects of crime and aggression were manifested in migration surges 
from these regions to the us (including unaccompanied children).35 the assump-
tion that solving the problems of the us (illegal immigration) must take place 
by strengthening the weakest nations in the region was a warranted one, because 
poverty and crime were the main factors forcing people to migrate to the us.
the us also declared support for the peace process in Colombia (stressing its 
commitment to close cooperation with the Colombian government).36 Colombia 
is one of the united states’ major allies in the region, a result of the domestic 
issues plaguing the country and the implications these have for the us. the 
obama administration inherited and continued one of the key us programs in 
Latin America – Plan Colombia. This strategy, announced in 1999 as the joint 
program of the us and Colombian governments, was meant to consolidate and 
enhance efforts in combating the problems of drug production and trade in the 
country. This is an issue which has direct consequences in the US, as most of the 
cocaine produced in Colombia ends up on the american market. obama took 
up office in a country which was the biggest cocaine market in the world – the 
34  the White house, National Security Strategy, February 2015, p. 27 available online: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.
pdf (accessed on 30.03.2017).
35  Ibidem, p. 28. 
36  Ibidem. 
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us was responsible for 40% of the world’s consumption of this drug, which is 
imported to the states mainly from Colombia.37 this brought about Washington’s 
engagement in combatting the drug trade in this country. 
the drug problem had been intensifying since the 1980s, when Colombia 
stopped being an intermediary in drug trafficking and became a producer. Within 
the two decades that followed, Colombia became the largest producer of illegal 
cocaine in the world.38 this was exacerbated by the ongoing Colombian civil war 
between the government and FarC (revolutionary armed Forces of Colombia) in 
the 20th century. However, in the 1980s and 1990s FARC was only superficially 
engaged in revolutionary rhetoric, the main body of its enterprise was centered on 
drug trafficking as a means of financing the organization and acts of terror against 
the government and the people of Colombia. the situation led to the diminishing 
(and, at times, even disappearance) of the government’s power over vast areas of 
the country, to the emergence of various paramilitary groups, and to the violation 
of human rights on a large scale. 
Plan Colombia entailed training the Colombian armed forces and the police to 
combat drug production and organized crime. despite criticism, the plan yielded 
significant results as the area of coca plantations in Colombia was reduced. Some 
of the plantations did move to Peru and Bolivia, however the overall area of coca 
plantations in latin america did decrease.39
Colombia made significant progress in combating organized crime during 
Álvaro Uribe’s presidency, although the presidency, itself, was quite controversial. 
even before obama came into power, the Colombian government undertook to 
improve the state of human rights in the country as these had been violated se-
verely in the past, even by former governments. As Obama took up office, a new 
president was also elected in Colombia and uribe was succeeded by Juan manuel 
santos, the former minister of defense. this new president was expected to bring 
about a change in policy with regards to the internal conflicts in the country. 
Obama’s administration supported the idea of ending civil conflicts by allowing 
the guerilla movement to take part in the social and political life of the country.
although the forms of american aid for Colombia were criticized, the us did 
not restrict the support it was providing the nation during obama’s presidency. 
Colombia had earlier already become one of the main recipients of american 
support, however the initiation of Plan Colombia can be seen as a liminal point 
in the cooperation of the two nations as it implied increased military aid on part 
37  un, World Drug Report 2010, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, United Na-
tions Publication, New York 2010, p. 72–74, available online: www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/
Wdr_2010/World_drug_report_2010_lo-res.pdf (accessed on 30.03.2017).
38  un, World Drug Report 2006, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, vol. 2, United 
nations Publication, new york 2006, p. 239, available online: www.unodc.org/pdf/Wdr_2006/
wdr2006_volume2.pdf (accessed on 30.03.2017).
39  un, World Drug Report 2010, op. cit., p. 65. For a critique of the program see: J. D. Rosen, 
The Losing War: Plan Colombia and Beyond, state university of new york Press, albany 2014.
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of the US. The most significant support was offered within the framework of 
the international narcotics Control and law enforcement program and by the 
narcotics Control fund, which is an expression of the priorities of us policy 
on Colombia.40 as was already noted, a major part of us aid for Colombia was 
aimed at strengthening security, yet, as in the case of mexico, this was to be done 
primarily through assisting national military forces in combatting the production 
and trade of drugs.41 
american aid for Colombia was not as substantial as for key nations of 
the Middle East, however during Obama’s time in office Colombia remained 
one of the primary beneficiaries of US security assistance. At the beginning of 
obama’s presidency Congress did, in fact, undertake to decrease military aid for 
Colombia in favor of providing other forms of support. the stance of Congress 
was motivated by criticism which pointed out that the over-militarization of the 
country had negative consequences (the violation of human rights) and that the 
‘Colombianization’ of the conflict was happening too slowly.42
stabilizing the situation in Colombia remained one of the security priorities 
of the Obama administration. In his last year in office (2016), Colombia was to 
continue to be the leading recipient of US financial assistance in Latin America, 
although as the conflict de-escalated the focus on military aid lessened. 43 
Plan Colombia was also criticized for lacking efficiency in curbing the 
amount of drugs that reached the us. nevertheless, it was successful because it 
contributed towards preventing civil war in Colombia. the defeat of the guerilla 
army (perceived as a terrorist organization in the us) by the military was one 
of the key reasons FarC changed its approach and, in the long term, the reason 
for the initiation of peace talks.44 the military success was by no means a given, 
because there continued to be a strong governmental faction ardently opposing 
both negotiation and reaching a compromise with the guerilla (this included for-
mer president uribe).
However, ending the conflict was one of the Obama administration’s main 
goals – ending the civil war and including FARC in political discourse meant that 
the US significantly reduced the problems connected to Colombian drug trade 
and production. obama’s administration was not content with mere rhetoric and, 
40  P. Fajardo-heyward, Understanding the Effect of Security Assistance on Human Rights: 
The Case of Plan Colombia, “the latin americanist” 2015, vol. 52, issue 2, p. 8. 
41  usaid, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 
1945-September 30, 2015, u.s. agency for international development, p. 97 available online: 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBaaF100.pdf (accessed on 30.03.2017).
42  P. Fajardo-heyward, op. cit., p. 9. 
43  P. J. meyer, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent trends 
and FY2016 Appropriations, “Congressional research service” 7 January 2016, p. 7, available on-
line: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/r44113.pdf (accessed on 30 march 2017); usaid, U.S. Overseas 
Loans and Grants…, p. 86, 97. 
44  J. s. Beittel, Peace Talks in Colombia, “Congressional research service”, 31 march 2015, 
available online: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/r42982.pdf (accessed on 30.03.2017). 
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on Santos’ request, took active part in the peace talks. Obama selected Bernard 
aronson, a diplomat experienced in leading negotiations in latin america, as the 
united states special envoy for the Colombian Peace Process. he was not to take 
part in the actual negotiations but to influence both sides in separate meetings. The 
us emphasized that their support lay with the santos government.45 according 
to commentators, the us considerably contributed to the talks and, ultimately, to 
the consensus that was reached between the sides.
For FarC the key issue was the accountability of the ‘guerrilleros’ in ameri-
can courts of law, where they were expected to be tried for drug trafficking and 
other crimes. Colombia had carried out many such extraditions in the past. it was 
up to the us to refrain from pressuring santos in this matter as the Colombian 
president himself stated that: “i don’t believe that any guerrilla is going to turn in 
his weapon only to go and die in a us jail.”46 aronson’s declaration that extradi-
tion would be solely at the discretion of the Colombian government and would 
not influence relations was a clear marker of Washington’s intentions and could 
have been crucial in reassuring FarC leadership.47
Before the final agreement was reached, Washington openly declared the 
will to support the realization of the peace process. the strategy of foreign aid, 
which was intended to help the former guerillas join society and ordinary political 
life, was dubbed ‘Peace Colombia.’48 obama mentioned this project in august 
2016, when he stressed the importance of the agreement reached by the santos 
government and FarC and guaranteed us support in the integration process of 
Colombia.49
although Plan Colombia’s success may have been limited, it was very obvi-
ous. however, it had the unexpected outcome of facilitating the development of 
a drug-trafficking network between the US and Mexico. This led to the flourishing 
45  the White house, Remarks as prepared to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sub-
committee on the Western Hemisphere, Bernard Aronson, U.S. Special Envoy for the Colombian 
Peace Process, 24 June 2015, Washington, d.C., available online: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/
FA/FA07/20150624/103679/HHRG–114-FA07-Wstate-AronsonB–20150624.pdf (accessed on 
30.03.2017).
46  s. Brodzinsky, The Key to Ending Colombia’s Five-Decade Civil War Could be the US, 
“the guardian” (19 may 2015) available online www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/co-
lombia-peace-talks-farc-rebels-us-envoy-bernard-aronson (accessed on 30.03.2017).
47  This Time is Different, „the economist”, 31 october 2015, available online: http://
www.economist.com/news/special-report/21676952-peace-process-could-become-example-
world-time-different (accessed on 30.03.2017).
48  r. rampton, Obama Pledges More than $450 Million Aid to Help Colombia Peace Plan, 
“reuters”, 5 February 2015, available online: www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-colombia-iduskC-
n0Vd2Xm (accessed on 30.03.2017). 
49  the White house, Statement by the President on the Colombia Peace Agreement, 25 au-
gust 2016, available online: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/08/25/
statement-president-colombia-peace-agreement (accessed on 30.03.2017).
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of criminal groups in mexico which, together with Colombia, is notorious for 
boasting the fastest development of drug-related criminal activity.50 
american relations with mexico remain one of the most complicated issues 
in us policies towards latin america. although relations have for years been 
overshadowed by disagreements stemming from mexican immigration to the us 
as well as immigration from other countries via mexico, which was caused by 
the differences in the development of the countries, there is also another reason 
for tension between the two states. mexico has been struggling with a ceaseless 
stream of violence that continues to destabilize the social, economic and politi-
cal functioning of the country. this violence is the product of criminal activities 
focused predominantly on the production and trafficking of drugs as well as the 
trafficking of people. The constant security crisis in Mexico has had an effect 
on the us and the latter unfortunately continues to contribute to perpetuating 
the problem. the us is the main point of weapons supply for mexican criminal 
organizations. 
mexico answered the rise in criminal activity with the militarization of anti-
drug policies. the process of militarization came to the fore during Felipe Cal-
derón’s presidency. As he took up office, Calderón announced a “war” on drugs 
which was to be fought against drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs). The aims 
of the army are different than those of the police so the employment of the military 
on a broad scale had a significant impact of the “war on drugs.”51
The US entered into a conflict with the drug cartels (DTOs) at Mexico’s 
request. As in the case of Colombia, US engagement came at a time of increased 
expenditure on security and defense (340% in Colombia and 125% in mexico).52 
the difference between Plan Colombia and us engagement in mexico lay, among 
others, in the reduced influence of the US Department of Defense in the latter 
case—mexico was unwilling to agree to the operational engagement of the ameri-
can army on mexican territory. 
the cooperation between the us and mexico was dubbed the mérida initia-
tive, because its nature was roughly agreed upon by presidents Bush and Calderón 
in mérida in march 2007. the implementing provisions were introduced in the 
following year. 
Before it entered cooperation through the mérida initiative, mexico was not 
a major beneficiary of American aid in combatting drug-related crime. While 
50  B. Bagley, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the 
Twentieth-First Century. “Woodrow Wilson international Center for scholars” (Washington d.C., 
2012), p. 5, 8, available online: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/BB%20Final.pdf 
(accessed on 01.06.2017). 
51  m. P. moloeznik, m. e. suzárez de garay, El proceso de militarización de la seguridad 
pública en México (2006–2010)”, “Frontera Norte” 2012, vol. 24, no. 48, p. 121–144. 
52  g. C. delgado-ramos, s. m. romano, m. ortega Bareña, Political-Economic Factors in 
U.S. Foreign Policy: The Colombia Plan, the Mérida Initiative and the Obama Administration, 
“latin american Perspectives” 2011, vol. 38, no. 4, p. 95, 97. 
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mexico was the initiator of the cooperation between the two states, it had earlier 
been reluctant towards liaising too closely with the us because of the concern 
over american interference in internal affairs.53 in this sense, the mérida initiative 
could be viewed as an organ of US influence or control in Mexico, comparable 
to similar programs in other latin american countries. after all, these programs 
were aimed at formulating strategies of combatting crime and the guerillas which 
were conceptualized in Washington and which employed american personnel 
and equipment. There are critics who point to the analogies between this system 
and that of the Cold War, when american aid in overthrowing dissidents was an 
element of bolstering US influence. 
therefore aid, such as military or political intervention, is seen as one of the 
instruments of us hegemony in the area. these critics maintain that a change in 
rhetoric which came about with the new administration was not accompanied by 
a genuine change of the us political arsenal in latin america—including the war 
on drugs.54 Mexico received significant aid from the US between 2008 and 2017. 
In 2007 the total financial aid equaled $64.4 million, only to rise to $412.5 mil-
lion in 2008. in the following years, it remained at this high level.55 once obama 
became president in 2011, the program was reevaluated and reshaped and the goals 
of the mérida initiative were augmented. the program was redesigned around four 
pillars. The first was the war on organized crime; the second, equally important, 
goal was the development of the rule of law and the protection of human rights 
in mexico. the third pillar was the creation of a modern border between the 
two nations (the “21st Century Border”) and the fourth was establishing strong 
communities which could serve as the foundation for the development of social 
programs and could stand to face the influence of criminal organizations. The 
program was agreed upon in may 2013, in mexico by obama and the new mexi-
can president, Peña nieto.56 The redefinition and development of the Initiative’s 
goal should be seen as a step in the right direction. obama’s administration and 
the mexican government sought to go beyond traditional, military methods of 
fighting criminal organizations and decided to try to weaken their infrastructure. 
The will to strengthen the rule of the law in Mexico was especially significant. 
This was not the first US effort to undertake cooperation with Latin America using 
this new method, so it is worth underlining that the us decided to reach for this 
approach in the case of mexico despite past failures in the region.
The difficulty in appraising the effectiveness of programs such as the Mérida 
initiative has been noticed by commentators. Washington stresses the triumphs 
of the Initiative, such as capturing cartel leaders (especially Joaquín “El Chapo” 
53  C. ribando seelke, k. m. Finklea, U.S. Mexico Security Cooperation: The Merida Initia-
tive and Beyond. Report for Congress, “Congressional research service” January 2017, available 
online: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/r41349.pdf (accessed on 18 January 2017), p. 13.
54  g. C. delgado-ramos, s. m. romano, m. ortega Bareña, op. cit., p. 95. 
55  C. ribando seelke, k. m. Finklea, op. cit., table a-i. 
56  Ibidem, p. 13. 
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guzmán), introducing the accusatorial justice system in mexico, improving prison 
standards, and increasing the effectiveness of mexican border control and sup-
porting its fight with illegal migration (150,000 immigrants from Central America 
were detained in 2015–2016).57 Critics of the program’s effectiveness point to the 
weakness and negligence of the mexican government in reaching the set objec-
tives. they also highlight the negative effects of the militarization of the war on 
drugs, the violation of human rights, and corruption. An often quoted example is 
the murder of 42 students in iguala, in september, 2014. the mexican police and 
justice system proved to be exceptionally indolent in solving the case. 
Both Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative may lead to the significant 
reduction of drug trafficking and organized crime in both countries. However, 
they will not solve the problems connected with drug production and trafficking 
within the region itself. Criminal activity will continue to flourish in other parts 
of latin america (in the andes and in Central america). analysts have called 
the transfer of organized crime to other parts of the region on account of some 
countries’ effective policies the “cockroach effect,” because the cartels disperse 
in the region like cockroaches when someone shines a light on them.58 
one of the reasons for this is the undiminished demand for illegal drugs in the 
american and european markets. moreover, drug consumption in latin america 
has also grown significantly in previous years. The growing, worldwide drug mar-
ket means that the problems of organized crime weakening latin american states 
and influencing US security remains one of the greatest challenges Washington 
faces in latin america. 
The anti-drug policies of the Obama administration were strongly influenced 
by earlier involvements. The declarations of Obama and of his officials, Gil Ker-
likowske, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and Hillary 
Clinton indicated that the administration had a negative assessment of the previ-
ous war on drugs. however, although certain changes may have been decided 
upon in Washington, the war on drugs generally remained unchanged in latin 
america.59 those who expected a change in the methods of combatting drug trade 
and trafficking in Latin America under Obama were disappointed. For instance, 
many were hoping for the halt to the aerial spraying of strong pesticides on ille-
gal coca plantations in Colombia. as examples from both mexico and Colombia 
show, obama’s administration worked towards the further militarization of anti-
drug policies although some of the constituent elements and objectives may have 
been changed (the us was more dependent on diplomatic methods). overall, the 
obama administration’s anti-drug policies, which were set to tackle one of the 
greatest problems of obama’s presidency, must be given a positive evaluation. 
although the policies themselves remain militarized, the administration endeav-
57  Ibidem. 
58  B. Bagley, op. cit., pp. 5, 11. 
59  g. C. delgado-ramos, s. m. romano, m. ortega Bareña, op. cit., p. 95. 
75From Continuity to Breakthrough: the obama administration’s…
ored to reach for a more diverse tool-set and to strengthen the national structures 
and the social unity of the countries most affected by this problem. 
the completion of the Colombia’s peace talks which were encouraged by 
the us should be seen as an accomplishment of american foreign policy during 
obama’s presidency. Just as in the case of normalizing relations with Cuba, this 
success was conditioned by the evolution of the political situation in a country 
that the us found extremely important strategically but also by the fact that us 
policymakers were able to maneuver beyond the bounds of existing conventions.
the normalization of relations with Cuba is seen as one of the main achieve-
ments of the obama presidency. us policy on Cuba since the Cuban revolution, 
when Washington severed all ties with havana and strove for international isola-
tion of the island, may be compared to the us refusal to recognize the People’s 
republic of China. this analogy led William leogrande to state that, “President 
Barack obama’s historic reversal of half a century of antagonism towards Cuba 
is reminiscent of richard nixon’s 1972 opening to China, and will likely be re-
membered as equally momentous.”60 this opinion rings true, providing the next 
administration does not question the normalization policy. 
reorienting us policy towards Cuba was intended to reverse the negative 
consequences of policy that Obama referred to as the “past five decades” had 
had. obama clearly stated that if a policy is not having desired effects, it must be 
changed – a concept that is difficult to disagree with. Obama’s first term in office 
did not foreshadow the breakthrough that was to happen in us-Cuban relations. 
on the contrary, it seemed that obama’s declarations from the presidential race, 
which indicated his readiness to correct us policy towards Cuba, would not result 
in significant change, and it appeared that his administration was simply going to 
maintain george W. Bush’s strategies. 
During Obama’s first term his administration only worked on easing the 
process of sending remittance from Cuban americans to their families on the 
island and on liberalizing the restrictions on travelling to Cuba.61 however, there 
were no substantial changes in terms of bilateral cooperation and the status quo in 
this matter was met with the strong reproach of latin american nations. the us 
policy of isolationism was only supported by latin america in the years directly 
following the victorious Cuban revolution. as time passed, this policy was less 
accepted and Washington remained as its lone proponent. as disappointed as latin 
american governments were that obama’s predecessors had decided to continue 
this strategy towards Cuba, they had high hopes that obama’s administration 
would change the policy.
60  W. m. leogrande, Normalizing US-Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past, 
“international affairs” 2015, vol. 91, issue 3, p. 473.
61  a. F. lowenthal, op. cit., p. 110. see also: the White house, Statement by the Presi-
dent on Cuba Policy Changes, 17 december 2014, available online: https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-president-cuba-policy-changes (accessed on 
30.03.2017). 
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during the 6th summit of the americas in april, 2012, in Cartagena, obama 
was strongly criticized by his Organization of American States partners – includ-
ing his strongest allies in the region, such as Colombia. the attempts to play 
down the conflict by American diplomats were not convincing and all of the 
latin american nations voted to invite Cuba to the 7th summit of the americas 
in Panama. The firm stance of Latin American nations, which surprised the US 
President, was, without a doubt, one of the deciding factors (perhaps the most 
important) that worked towards the change in us policy on Cuba. 
any criticism of the caution or even passivity presented by the obama ad-
ministration must take into account that the reorientation of us policy on Cuba 
was limited by factors inside the us, as well as by the political will of the Cuban 
regime. it was also strongly affected by historical events which, in the case of 
Cuba, had an unprecedented influence on US policy. Obama himself noticed that 
the severance of mutual relations between the us and Cuba was a relic of the Cold 
War. Moreover, it was sorely unjustified as the US maintained relations with both 
communist China and Vietnam – the latter a country which came to symbolize 
Cold War hostility.62 
there is no doubt that the us strategy of not recognizing and placing em-
bargoes upon Cuba that started in the 1960s was one of the axioms of us foreign 
policy. None of the political powers in the US had the courage to question the 
sense of this course of action although it was clearly ineffective. during the Cold 
War, Cuba’s isolation was triggered as a reaction to Castro’s policy of exporting 
revolution and so, did find justification. However, even then, the US policy on 
Cuba was brought into question. If embargoes fail to accomplish anything in the 
short term, it is very unlikely that they will do so in the long term.63 liberals ob-
served that not only was the us policy of isolating Cuba unsuccessful but it also 
had negative effects on the general us policy on all of latin america. 64
Yet, American politicians insisted on retaining their firm stance towards 
Cuba. The Republican Party was the most vocal advocate of this approach – they 
underlined the strongly anti-communist nature of their position and rejected the 
possibility of normalizing relations with Cuba. anti-communism was also the 
driving force behind the democrats’ position, which they treated as a test of their 
own credibility in the domestic arena.65 
once the Cold War was over, internal affairs played a key role in maintaining 
the Cuba policy. Just as in the past, an important role in shaping and up-keeping 
the policy was played by the anti-Castro Cuban diaspora, living mainly in Florida. 
this is one of the most politically important states in the us and is counted as 
62  the White house, Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes, op. cit.
63  s.h. allen, op. cit.
64  liberals underlined the importance of normalizing us-Cuba relations as early as in the 
1980s, as reagan’s anti-communist offensive swept through latin america. see: W. m. leo-
grande, A Party Divided and Paralyzed, “the nation”, 24 october 1988, p. 395. 
65  W. m. leogrande, A Party Divided…
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one of the so-called swing states. Both republican and democrat representatives 
of Florida in the Capitol feared losing the support of this important state, which 
had voters with Cuban roots and well-defined political views.66 it is worth noting 
that the democratic position on Cuba was heterogeneous and part of the party has 
always been for the normalization of relations with havana.67 
under these circumstances the change of the Cuban diaspora’s position on the 
matter had a significant influence on the adjustment of US policy towards Havana. 
After the revolution Cuban Americans were strong advocates of an iron-fisted 
approach to the Cuban regime. the Cuban american national Foundation, which 
comprises a community of conservative, anti-Castro, Cuban americans, played 
a central role in shaping us policy. Considerable funds allowed this organization 
to manipulate the mechanisms of American politics in order to meaningfully influ-
ence us policy and render the normalization of relations with Cuba impossible 
from the 1980s until 2008.68 the will to maintain the embargoes placed on the 
island was based on a belief expressed by many Republicans – that normaliza-
tion would prolong the existence on the communist regime despite its various 
economic problems, whereas embargoes and sanctions were expected to utterly 
destroy the Cuban economy and, in consequence, the political system.69 
however, during obama’s presidency, there came a change in the outlook 
of Cuban americans on the matter; this was in tune with earlier observed trends. 
surveys from the early 1990s showed that a vast majority of the Cuban diaspora 
(87%) supported the embargo. yet over time the number of Cuban americans 
who could not see the purpose of the us policy and were in favor of lessen-
ing restrictions grew. the change in judgment stemmed from the demographic 
transformation that the diaspora had been experiencing – the first emigrants who 
surged from Cuba to the us were motivated by politics whereas the migrants 
from the 1980s and later were motivated by economics. the later immigrants 
were also adamant about preserving their relationships with family on the island. 
These factors affected the position of Cuban Americans and, in consequence, the 
importance of the Cuban diaspora in the american political system.70 the Cuban 
lobby could no longer influence the Washington elites the way it had in the past 
because the expectations of Cuban americans had changed. 
Castro’s regime survived the Cold War and the fall of its ally, the ussr. 
Cuba felt the loss of foreign aid from Moscow like a blow – it was forced to aban-
66  the economist, If Not Now, When?, “the economist”, 5 april 2014, available online: 
www.economist.com/news/leaders/21600117-would-be-especially-good-time-change-amer-
icas-relations-cuba-if-not-now (accessed on 12.06.2017).
67  W. m. leogrande, A Party Divided and Paralyzed, op. cit., p. 395–397. 
68  Idem, Normalizing US-Cuba Relations…, p. 476.
69  J. azel, The New Cuba Policy: Fallacies and Implications, “World affairs” 2015, vol. 178, 
issue 3, p. 21–27.
70  W. m. leogrande, Normalizing US-Cuba relations: escaping the shackles of the past, 
op. cit., p. 478.
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don the idea of exporting revolution and had to cease supporting revolutionaries 
around the world.71 ultimately, the regime gained the support of Venezuela under 
Hugo Chávez, however financial aid from this country was not able to sustain 
the underdeveloped and inefficient Cuban economy, which was overwhelmed by 
systemic failure. therefore, the change in the Cuban regime’s approach to the us 
was conditioned by a failing economy and a pessimistic view on how to solve 
this crisis in isolation. there is no doubt that the economic troubles in Venezuela, 
which led to the shrinking of Venezuelan aid, also influenced the Cuban regime’s 
stance on the us. 
the close relationship between Cuba and Venezuela had been one of the 
pivotal factors in the balance of power between the us and latin america. as 
mentioned above – Cuba would not have endured the fall of the USSR without 
Venezuela’s support. Chávez’s backing undeniably allowed the Cuban regime to 
refrain from reform and liberalization. although the relationship between havana 
and Caracas was asymmetric and Cuba was more dependent on Venezuela, Chávez 
also reaped some benefits – the alliance with Cuba led to the dogmatization of 
Venezuelan policy and strengthened its anti-american nature. the close coopera-
tion of the two countries created various hurdles for us policy in latin america 
so Washington sought to weaken the alliance between havana and Caracas. it 
was rightly assumed that reducing financial aid for Cuba would strengthen the 
conciliatory tendencies in Cuba’s foreign policy and be conducive to the liberali-
zation of the government.72
The change of head of state was a defining circumstance which led Cuba to 
adopt a pragmatic attitude towards the us. raul, who was willing to begin negotia-
tions with Washington, replaced the uncompromising Fidel. It is difficult to know 
how strongly Cuban policy was influenced by genuine divergences in the viewpoints 
of Fidel and his brother. nevertheless, it can certainly be said that a change in policy 
became possible only after raul Castro’s inauguration as president. 
Both Washington and Havana agreed that normalizing relations after fifty 
years of animosity was necessary and negotiations began. an important role in 
these was played by Canadian diplomats who had worked towards moderating 
the conflict since the 1960s. From 2013, the Canadian government co-organized 
seven confidential meetings between the US and Cuba. Simultaneously, Secretary 
of state John kerry met with the chief Cuban diplomat, Bruno rodriguez. the 
Vatican also had a part in the negotiations.73 
the exchange of prisoners was one of the main bones of contention. this 
issue, which seemed minor in light of the breakthrough that engaging in mutual re-
71  Ibidem, p. 476.
72  h. a. trinkunas, t. Piccone, The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: The Beginning of the End? 
“latin america initiative Policy Brief”, the Brookings institutions, Washington, d.C. 2014. 
73  P. kornbluh, W. m. leogrande, Cuba Confidential, “mother Jones” 2015, vol. 40, issue 5, 
p. 44–61.
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lations was expected to be, turned out to be an obstacle which halted negotiations. 
the us made a bid to secure the freedom of allan gross who had been arrested 
in Cuba in 2009 and sentenced for espionage. however, Washington rejected the 
Cuban offer of exchanging gross for three Cubans arrested in the us and called 
it disproportionate. this was one of the central controversies of the negotiations 
between the two nations and only a solution could lead to the normalization of 
mutual relations. once a compromise was reached (gross was freed, among oth-
ers) a breakthrough in us-Cuban relations became possible.74 
obama announced a reorientation in us-Cuban relations in december 2014. 
the very way in which this was done was unprecedented as the presidents of both 
nations addressed their citizens at the same time (December 17 – “D17”), declar-
ing that a new chapter in the nations’ relations had begun. obama criticized the 
strategy of the preceding 55 years and said it “has failed to advance our interests.” 
he indicated that us policy towards Cuba had been shaped by the realities of the 
Cold War and its aim was to “promote democracy.” however, “though this policy 
has been rooted in the best of intentions, no other nation joins us in imposing 
these sanctions, and it has had little effect ….” the normalization announced by 
obama was to entail establishing diplomatic relations, removing Cuba from the 
list of countries promoting terrorism, reducing restrictions connected to travel, 
trade, telecommunication and financial services. 75 
the process of normalization was symbolized by permitting americans to 
bring Cuban cigars and rum back to the us. the normalization of us-Cuban rela-
tions was met with the enthusiastic reaction of Cubans expecting the improvement 
of living conditions. While the communist ideology still has a strong presence in 
society, there is a general conviction that actions must be undertaken to improve 
living conditions (“no se puede comer la politica.”)76
ConClusions
as a presidential candidate, obama criticized Bush for neglecting latin 
american issues. this neglect was caused by excessive resources being commit-
ted to the war in Afghanistan and Iraq.77 this same neglect was not to be found in 
the obama administration although it had to rise to the challenges of withdrawing 
troops from Iraq and fighting the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
it cannot be said that these, or any other matters, overshadowed latin american 
issues – simply put, this part of the world had generally lost much if its signifi-
cance from Washington’s point of view after the end of the Cold War, once the 
74  P. kornbluh, A New Deal With Cuba, “The Nation” 2015, vol. 300, issue 2/3, p. 4–8. 
75  Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes, op. cit.
76  Ibidem; P. kornbluh, A New Deal With Cuba…, p. 5. 
77  obama’08, A New partnership…
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balance of power had shifted on an international level and political situation in 
latin america had changed. 
Obama’s first term in office disappointed those who expected a significant 
breakthrough in inter-american relations. When asked about the difference be-
tween Bush and obama, evo morales ironically answered: “if something is 
changed, it’s just the color of the president that’s changed.”78 regardless of the 
context in which this was said, it expressed the general view of the latin ameri-
can left on obama’s presidency (not just that of Chávez supporters.) liberal 
and progressive communities in the us also noticed that obama’s policy simply 
marked a continuation of that of his predecessor – only the rhetoric had changed.
however, Barack obama could not initiate a revolutionary upheaval in us 
policy on latin america and this was never actually his intention. the correc-
tions in us policy in the region that he had announced were meant to guarantee 
a partnership between the us and latin american nations. in light of Washing-
ton’s limited possibilities of influencing the region, it was decided that solving 
common issues such as drug trafficking and illegal migration should be done in 
collaboration. 
the us stances on the coup in honduras and on Cuba were both based on 
the same principle of political pragmatism. this approach in the case of hondu-
ras was bitingly criticized within the us as well as in latin america, because it 
was maintained despite an unconstitutional change of head of state. establishing 
relations with Cuba, however, was met with widespread approval throughout the 
Western hemisphere. in this second case, obama went against the policy of iso-
lating Cuba, accepted by political elites of both parties, a policy which had also 
isolated the united states at the beginning of the 21st century. 
During Barack Obama’s two terms in office, US policy was managed in the 
face of rapidly changing political realities and during an economic crisis. although 
latin america was not one of the top issues the new administration needed to 
tackle, Obama, influenced by various factors such as the demands of Latin Ameri-
can nations, managed to truly end the Cold War in latin america by normalizing 
us relations with Cuba. he did not radically change his predecessors’ policy in 
other areas such as combating the drug trade and illegal migration. Perhaps such 
a change was not even possible. overall, obama’s policy in the region must be 
evaluated positively as it did lead to the us extending its cooperation with its 
partners in the organization of american states and to a real breakthrough in 
relations with Cuba. 
78  democracynow.org, Bolivian President Evo Morales on President Obama: “I Can’t Be-
lieve a Black President Can Hold So Much Vengeance Against an Indian President”, 23 april 
2010, available online: www.democracynow.org/2010/4/23/bolivian_president_evo_morales_to_
president (30.03.2017).
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Tytuł: Od ciągłości do przełomu: polityka Obamy w Ameryce Łacińskiej
Streszczenie: Wybór Baracka Obamy wzbudziły wielkie oczekiwania w Ameryce Łacińskiej. 
Oczekiwano, że Obama odnowi stosunki międzyamerykańskie zaniedbane przez administrację 
George’a W. Busha. Jednak Stany Zjednoczone już nie postrzegają Ameryki Łacińskiej jako „naj-
bardziej niebezpiecznego obszaru na świecie”. Kryzys gospodarczy i problemy międzynarodowe, 
z którymi administracja Obamy musiała się zmierzyć, przyczyniły się do tego, że Ameryki Łaciń-
skiej nie stała się priorytetem w polityce Waszyngtonu. Jednym z pierwszych wyzwań dla nowej 
administracji było usunięcie przez wojsko prezydenta Hondurasu. Stany Zjednoczone przyjęły 
w tej sprawie pragmatyczne stanowisko i trzymały się od niej z daleka. gdyż nie było nadziei, że 
konstytucyjny prezydent odzyska swoje stanowisko niezależnie od sankcji lub presji politycznej 
Waszyngtonu. Administracja Obamy przyczyniła się znacząco do sukcesu procesu pokojowego 
w Kolumbii. Stabilizowanie sytuacji w tym państwie pozostawało jednym z priorytetów polityki 
bezpieczeństwa administracji Obamy. Polityka ta nie ograniczała się realizacji planu Colombia, 
lecz oznaczała też czynny udział w rozmowach pokojowych i wsparcie porozumienie. Admini-
stracja Obamy rozszerzyła także cele programu Mérida Initiative wykraczając poza tradycyjne, 
wojskowe metody walki z organizacjami przestępczymi. USA zamierzały wzmocnić rząd prawa 
w Meksyku. Największym osiągnięciem tej administracji jest normalizacja stosunków z Kubą, 
był to prawdziwie rewolucyjny krok. Stało się to możliwe ze względu na zmianę poglądów opinii 
publicznej w Stanach Zjednoczonych na temat normalizacji, presji ze strony państw Ameryki Ła-
cińskiej oraz zmiany podejścia kubańskiego reżimu wobec USA.
Słowa klucze: Polityka latynoamerykańska Stanów Zjednoczonych, administracja Obamy, Kuba, 
plan Colombia, demokracja, program mérida initiative
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